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LEVINAS: JUST WAR OR JUST WAR:
PREFACE TO TOTALITY and INFINITY
The worst form of violence is war. In war humans kills one
another, whether directly face-to-face or anonymously at a
distance. Likc too many men in the twentieth century, Emmanuel
Levinas (1906-1995) experienced war firsthand. I-Ie experienced
several wars. As a child in the Ukraine and Lithuania there was
WWI, the Bolshcvik Revolution and the civil war of Red against
Whitc Russians. As a French citizen hc received military training
in the early 1930s.1 When WWII began in 1939 Levinas was
dratled and mobilized as a military interpreter, and was quickly
captured with the retreating French Tenth Anny at Rennes. He
spent the war years in a prisoner-of-war labor camp for Jews in
Gennany, near Hanover. Levinas's entire family -- his parents
and his two younger brothers, Boris and Aminadav -- were
murdered by the Nazis. After WWII, by virtue of eitizenship he
was close to France's war in Indo-China, the war of Algerian
independence, and the long "cold war" between the Soviet bloc
and the West. By virtue of religion he was elose to Israel's 1948
war of independence, and its subsequent wars with its Arab
neighbors.
Levinas's most extended discussion of war is quite
prominent. It is a central topic of the nine page preface to his
magnum opus, Totality and /llfinity (1961 ).2 Written after the
book's completion, the prefaee continues the thoughts begun in
its concluding section, entitled "Being as Goodness -- the I --
Pluralism Peace.") In those concluding pages Levinas
characterizes the ethical relation, which is the primary topic of
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TOlalil)' a/ld 1lljillity, the "face-to-face" relation bctween land
other where both terms retain their independence by relating
across moral and juridical demands, he characterizes the
pluralism the ethical relation as alone making peace possible. He
writes: "The unity of plurality is peace, and not the coherence of
the elements that constitute plurality. Peace therefore cannot be
identified with the end of combats that cease for want of
combatants, by the defeat of some and the victory of others, that
is, with cemeteries or future universal empires. Peace must be
my peace, in a relation that starts from an land goes to the other,
in desire and goodness, where thc I both nlaintains itself and
exists without e,goism.'" It is this discussion of peace -- as a
function of thc plurality of persons made possible by ethics --
concluding Totality and Injinity that Levinas prefaces with a
discussion of war at the beginning of Totality and Illjinity. One
way of understanding the very title of Totality alld Illjinity, then,
is by reference to the difference between "War and Peace,"
according to which reading the work performed in the body of
Totality and Illjinity, its philosophical labor, would be a joumey
from war to peace.
War is first mentioned in the second sentence of Totality and
Injinity, directly following its more famous opening sentence,
which reads: "Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest
importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."
Totality and Injinity is one long argument that not only are we not
duped by morality but precisely morality rather than
epistcmology and the ontology constructed under its strictures --
represents humanity's only chance of not being duped. Ethics,
in contrast to epistemology, does not merely "represenf' the
chance of not being duped. The radical sincerity of the moral
relations ethics elucidates "accomplish" or "produce" the true. In
contrast to the autonomous interests of knowledge, ethics is a
wisdom, its "knowledge" is inseparable from virtue, bound to
moral and juridical relations which lie at the origin of sense. The
proper philosophical mode of ethics, then, is more akin to
exegesis than to thematization, for it retains its enrootedness in a
signification that exceed its very signs, a language which retains
the traces -- the moral force -- of the saying which is the source
of the significations said.
Levinas invokes war, however, as a "strong man" opponent
to his argument. It represents the best evidence that humans are
indecd duped by morality, that sincerity is itself a charade, an
epi-phenomenon, merely a role or mask in a deeper more
nefarious plot. Hence the rhetorical appearance of war
immediately after the opening interrogative sentence of Totality
and /llfillity. That war belies morality comes as no surprise,
perhaps, given Levinas's own expericnces ofwar. But the threat
war represents does not depend on the peculiarities of Levinas's
life experiences. Its challenge is more serious, more constant,
indecd, perennial.
Grammatically, war is introduced into Totality and Infinity
with a question. A certain kind of questioning, phiJosophy as
fundamental questioning, a questioning of fundamentals, as we
shaJl see, introduces war. "Does not lucidity," reads the second
sentence, the first interrogative sentence of Totality alld Infinity,
"the mind's openness upon the truc, consist in catching sight of
the permanent possibility of war?" The question appears strange
at first glance. Surely war -- expcrienced and depicted in tenns
of brute force, bombs, bullets, explosions, devastation, death,
wounds, heroism -- is a threat to morality, of this there can be
little doubt. But is war then a phi/osophica/ issue tuming on "the
mind's openness upon the tnle"? How is the mind's recognition
of truth, that is to say, science, surely one of humanity's noblest
enterprises, at the same time a "catching sight of the permanent
possibility ofwar," humanity's most debased condition? To
answer this perplexity, we turn directly to the next sentence: "The
state of war suspends morality; it divests the etemal institutions
and obligations of their etemity and rescinds ad interim the
unconditional imperatives." This is straightforward. Tbe most
unconditional of the unconditional imperatives, the most etemal,
if one can say this, of the etemal obligations, is, of course, the
command not to murder. Life is minimally the material
condition of al1 human endeavors, whether morality, art, sport,
religion, or science. Secular and religious agree on this point.
Precisely the command not to murder, so goes the positive
argument of Totality alld /nfi1lity, is what shines forth as the
moral surplus, the ethical transcendence of the "face" of the
other, bursting through its very manifestation with more than that
presence can contain, as the moral condition of al1 conditions.
The face, and by extension the body of the other, the alterity of
the other, introduces beyond its own sensuous prescnce, bursting
through its own form, the command: "Thou shalt not murder."
For Levinas the proper mode of transcendence occurs neither as
some miraculous opening of the skies, nor, contesting Heidegger,
as anxiety before an ever oncoming death or as the history which
would exceed but give meaning to my finitude as its never to be
fully appropriated context. Such nleanings do indeed escape the
immediate self-presence of consciousness, but they do so as
oncoming horizons, as incomplete projects, as the "not yet"
appropriated. rather than in the manner of the transcendence of
the face of the other, whose alterity pierces subjectivity,
challenges it, cuts into..to its deepest recesses. The proximity of
the other person, ethical proximity, comes as the imposition of
the unassumable, "contact" with alterity as such, the other as a
command laid upon the self to rise to unassumable moral
obligation, inverting the natural or rational for-itself to the
radically insufficiency of a for-the-other, the self as subject to the
other, as moral responsibility for the other and for a11 others,
hence the seIf as moral expiation, as the very call to social justice,
turning thc self inside out. In the face of the genuine
transcendence of morality and justice, subjectivity would emerge
as an inversion of its natural COllatus, subject as subjection to the
other. These are the lines of thought pursued in Totality and
Illfinity. War would make a mockery ofthem.
Is not talk of the irreducible alterity of the other rendered
naive and foolish by war, where the other beconles a corpse?
And if not the other, then myself. Is not the pacific moral
relation made possible by language, speech, expression, where a
moral surplus signifies through a "saying" which is always more
than what is said, is not this language rendered merely derisory,
manipulative, strategic, by the cunning of war propaganda, not to
mention the silencing and death effected by bullets, bombs,
chemicals and biological weapons? And what of the related
silences produced through sophisticated psychological and
physiological techniques of torture, brainwashing, police
interrogation? To be sure, morality is nöt ignorant of evil. It
precisely opposes evil. Just as one person can suffer for another,
one person can refuse the other, turn away, remain indifferent.
The humanity of ethics is not a steady state but a struggle against
the inhumanity of evil. But war is different. There humans kill
one another, not like humans but like starved animals. War in
this sense is more than the opposite of morality, as evil is the
opposite of good, it is rather, as Levinas has indicated, the very
suspension of morality. If morality hinges on the ab-solute
alterity of the other, hence the infinity of goodness, war would be
absolute evil, if one can say this. Neither war nor peace, then,
would be ultimately definable in tenns of oppositions, because
neither would depend on specifications of a more general genus.
But war exceeds opposition by totalization, the elimination of
othemess.
With these thou~hts in mind, we can locate war within the
hierarchie schema of Levinas's thought as folIows: (I) absolute
good orienting from above, manifest through the transcending
moral height of the other, the other's absolute priority over the
self; (2) the polar historical struggle of good versus evil: the other
as needy, the self as the interiorization of for-the-other, as
one-for-the-other, the struggle of compassion against hardness of
the heart at the inter-personal morallevel, the struggle for justice
against injustice at the social, economic and political level; (3)
absolute evil below, killing, war, the suspension ofmorality. The
realm of the ethical, including both morality and justice, where
"the humanity of the human" is constituted and institutionalized,
arises in relation to the absolute good "manifest" through the
absolute alterity of the face, irreducible moral transcendence.
The ethical self charged by this transcendence, is ordained into a
moral subjectivity as an insatiable desire for the most desirable,
for "the good beyond being." Concrete ethicallife, the struggle
to perform moral actions and institute justice, takes place on the
historical plane where relative goods and evils are judged closer
or farther from the pure good that orients them absolutely. War
would be the mockery of this entire ethical schematism, calling
not only the good, but both good and evil into question, rendering
them ontologically nugatory, sociologically and psychologically
naive.
War is thus a mirror image of good. Just as the absolute
good renders the concrete ethical realm possible, war would
reorient that same realm extra-morally, turning it into an amoral
play of forces, interactions whose significance comes without
reference to good and evil. Like the absolute good above, but
from "the bottom," as it were, war would be incomparable, hence
in truth not an absolute evil (such would be the perspective of
ethics) but an alternative to both good and evil, the destruction of
morality and justice as such. The image of a mirror image is a
good one, if we recall Kant's paradox of "incongruent
counterparts," where the hand reflected in the mirror is point for
point the same hand as the one it reflects, but is nonetheless
incongruent with it (the right hand becoming a left hand; the left
hand becoming a fight hand). The mirror image of the ethical,
from the point ofview ofthe ethical, is the unethical; but from its
own point ofview, the point ofview ofwar, it is the extra-ethicaJ,
otherwise than ethics, a pJay of forces. Thus, what in peace is the
"murder" of a human being, in war is "killing," "slaughter,"
"wasting" the enemy. The negativity of war would neither be
evil nor nothingness, but indifference to morality, shameless
shamelessness, guiltless guiltlessness. Nietzsehe will call it
"strength" or "health" or "mastery." War, then, is not only a
violation ofmorality, it is absolute violence, violence absolutized,
force against force.
But why is such an eventuality linked to because glimpsed
by "the mind's openness upon the true"? The logic of
epistemology batks at the idea of the transcendence. Relation,
not transcendence, is its final word. Logic refuses to assign
autonomous meaning to transcendence. The maximum alterity,
if onc can put the matter this way, that logic can validate, is not
transcendence but the "transcendental," that is to say,
extrapolation from the reatm of the relative to its logically
necessary and absolute condition. Kant called this logical
requirement for completion, for finality, for wholeness, the
"interest of rcason," whether it could be satisfied (as Hegel
thought, through he transfonned the very notion of reason to
accomplish its fulfillment) or not (as Kant thought). It explains
philosophy has so long been at odds with the very possibility of
the Creator God as conceived by revealed religion. The
transcendent absolves itself from any relations, and hence, for
philosophy, with its knowledge interests, can neither be
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experienced nor known. Philosophy considers all efforts to
introduce transcendence to be forms of nonphilosophy, labeling
these efforts empty speculation, superstition, ignorance, error,
madness, immaturity, delusion, slavery, willfulness,
stubbomncss, projection, tyranny, and the like. One need only
rearl Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise (1670) to assemble
an almost complete list of the many derogatory labels philosophy
has used against the presumptions of absolute transcendence.
Having fought long and hard on legitimate epistemological
grounds to rise above opinion, mythology and poesis, philosophy
is not prepared to submit to an ethics, such as Levinas's, buHt on
the absolute transcendence of the good, and is indeed quite weil
armcd against jt. The issue for Levinas, however, is to show,
despite philosophy's epistemological resistance, how ethics
stands or falls in relation -- an "unrelating relation,"4 to be sure
-- to absolute goOO, the good beyond being, and thus to show that
"we are not duped by morality."
The opening question of Totality and Infinity, whether or not
we are duped by morality, has to do, then, with the significance
ofmoral Janguage and conduct, with their sincerity. Ifwar is the
ultimate ground of signification whether one prefers
fonnulations such as Thrasymachus's "might makes right,"
Hobbes' "war of all against all," or Nietzsche's "mobile army of
metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms,"5 -- to be
moral, i.e., to be sincerely moral, Le., to be sincere, is to be duped
by morality. Recalling the extra-moral attitude of the pagan
Greeks, Nietzsehe cleverly sums up the anti-moral position in a
nutshell: "Foolishness, not Sill!,,6 Machiavelli and Spinoza, more
circumspect than Nietzsehe, would say: "prudence," use morality
as a mask, be moral insincerely, i.e., don't really be moral but
appear to be moral (either to save yourself ör to manipulate the
masses, or both, it does not mauer). Levinas's question, then, is
4TI. p. 195.
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[TnltIJ alltl I.ie i" (", Ullra-Moral Sense] (1973).
6Fricdrich Nietzsehe, 011 Ihe Genealog)' 0/ Morals (1881), second essay,
section 23.
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not directed to the difficult moral cases, where a moral agent may
be duped by an apparent good that turns out to be evil, or by an
evil that turns out to be good, or by a partial good weighed
against another partial good, moral agency tom between two
goods or two evils. In all the cases the issue remains a moral one,
the effort to find the good in difficult conlplex situations. Rather
the issue raised is one of being duped by the entire struggle of
good against evil. War, the blood and guts of real war, a11 out
war, whatever reasons are given for its justification, would be the
ultimate evidence for this claim. 'The mind's lucidity in its search
for truth would apparently catch sight of this pennanent
possibility, even in times of apparent peace. Peace, it would
corne to .suspect, 1S but a form of war, war modulated by the
impositions of past victories and dcfeats. But why single out the
mind in its lucidity, in its search for truth?
Is this not to see in the mind's lucidity an essential irony or
cynicism? It would know better. It would be superior to all the
moralists. Its figure is Raskalnokov, beyond good and evil, or at
least he thought so for a time, and with terrible consequences. Or
the Marquis de Sade, whose knowledge and model of nature
authorized a11 behaviors. The life of the mind is fOT philosophy
the life of questioning. All questions may be asked. Am I my
brother's keeper? Levinas will say that even to ask this question,
to raises doubts regarding one's obligations and responsibilities
toward the neighbor, is already to have failed the neighbor and
succumbed to evil. Philosophy is shocked by this point of view,
insists on its rights, asks its questions. Thus nothing is
authoritative until checked by reason. But does reason see the
good? Is reason the proper corrclative to goodness? Is morality
rational? By what standards? Must morality be judged by the
standards of truth? Of course, morality cannot be a stupidity, but
that is not the issue. The issue is whether reason, holding to its
own standards, can see the reason to be good.
In the body of Totality and Infinity Levinas will argue that
the very temporality of morality, where the self is obligated by
the other prior to its own syntheses of identification, deeper than
its rational mediations, or its contractual negotiations with
alterity, cutting these structures of the for-itsel f to the quick,
introjecting the selfmore deeply, in a passivity more passive than
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receptivity, in a suffering for the other's suffering, that this very
temporality escapes the synthetic or ecstatic temporality of
knowing. The mind's lucidity, its search for the true, is precisely
a process of identification, identifying "this as that." But the
good reaches the self prior to its capacities of identification.
Knowing, then, will take the unsolicited shock of morality for
ignorance, fool ishness, naivete, slavery. But let us stick to the
preface.
"Does not lucidity, the mind's openness upon the troe,
consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?"
Why does the mind, in its very lucidity, in its openness upon the
true, end up always catching sight of the possibility of war?
Levinas .answers: "We do not need obscure fragments of
Heraclitus to prove that being reveals itself as war to
philosophical thought, that war does not only affect it as the most
patent fact, but as the very patency, or the truth, of the rea1."?
What is the connection between the mind's lucidity, truth, reality,
and war? Levinas's final answer is one word: totality. "The
visage ofbeing that shows itselfin war," Levinas writes, "is fixed
in the concept oftotality, which dominates Western philosophy.nS
A final refonnulation of our question: what is the
connection, or what are the connections, between the mind's
lucidity, truth, reality, war and totality? The answer is clear: the
truth of reality revealed to the mind in its lucidity is always
"fixed in the concept oftotality." What does this mean? How or
why is this so?
1"0 know is to explain, to relate, to synthesize, to identify, to
understand "x as y," to Iocate an individual within a context, the
unknown within the known. "Individuals are reduced," Levinas
writes, "to being bearers of forces that command them
unbeknown to themselves. The meaning of individuals (invisible
'TI, p. 21
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outside of this totality) is derived from the totality.,,9 For the
mind in its lucidity meaning does not come from the individual
qua individual. Thus an individual's moral agency could not
derive from itself, from some inner faculty, such was the error of
a11 the moral sentimentalists, whether they saw the human as
innately evil (e.g., the doctrine of "original sin") or innately good
(e.g., Shaftesbury). The sense of any individual, to the extent
that is has meaning, derives from its context, structure, system,
ultinlately from a totality. Insofar as the mind's lucidity sees the
inter-relations between al1 individuals within one system -- the
universe which is always one -- each individual is ultimately
dcfined as a function of al1 others. The most distant star is Iinked
to an ant's antennae. Relations define terms, which are nothing
outside tnose relations.
Lucidity, then, consists in grasping the "forces that
command [individuals] unbeknown to themselves." One
recognizes this lucidity at work in the hard sciences, for certainly
no one sees the atoms and force fields that are said to determine
natural reality. But what disturbs Levinas is not knowledge per
se, but rather its hegemonization, the imposition of this fonn of
lucidity -- differential knowledge -- as if it were the only or the
total fonn oflucidity, and hence the one and only form oflucidity
appropriate to such "objects" as human beings. And yet the
hegemonization ofknowledge is not some accident but contained
within the very nature or impetus ofknowledge, whose "interest"
is ultinlately to elaborate thc whole, the detcrminate whole,
within which individuals make sense.
Of course there can be no doubt that humans can be studied
objectively. Humans, like all material beings, have a certain
chemical composition, are subject to certain physical forces.
Humans also interact with other humans in predictable ways,
ways uncovered by sociology, political science, economics. It
must be emphasized that Levinas does not object to knowledge,
and will argue that knowledge is required by justice. His
objection, .however, is that knowledge is not its own ground, is
not the total account it pretends to be. Furthennore, his objection
is that knowledge, when taken on its own, can never understand
9TI. pp. 21-22.
morality, but instead glimpse the permanent possibility of war.
Hence Levinas will not propose in Tota/ity alld !Ilfinity a more
refined epistenlology. Rather, he will accentuate thc imposition
ethics makes on epistemology, from beyond its confines. I-Ie will
insist that beyond epistemology all is not ignorance. Instead, he
will arguethat within epistemology lies the threat of ignorance,
ignorance ofright and wrong, good and evil.
The truth or reality of the human individual, according to
knowledgc, would consist not in the individuality of the
individual in his or her moral integrity or singularity, as the
subject of obligations and the bearer of responsibilities, but rather
the individual's integration into a larger whole, its place in a
totality, the "role," as we say today, one inevitably plays, whether
consciously or not, within in a larger scheme, whether our eyes
are closed or open, awake or asleep. The Cartesians thought of
the theater within which human individual are puppets as a
mechanics ultimately reducible to a lnathesis; Hegel considered it
a dialectical Logic and called its hold over human individuals
"the cunning of history"; Heidegger calls it the "ontological
difference," or "language," the "hollse of being"; Derrida, will
rename the ontological difference in the house of language
"differance." In every case thc same philosophical gesture
prevails, the same epistemological impetus to reduce the
individual to a differential node.
Knowtedge would thus reduce moral freedom to an
epiphenomenon, whether in the name of a logic of necessary or
differential forces basicalJy material (Hobbes, Spinoza, La
Mettrie, Sade, Nietzsche), historical (Hegel, Spencer, Heidegger,
Foucault), economic (Smith, Marx), psychological (Freud, Jung),
or linguistic (Derrida). In every case, human freedom would not
be itself, would not be free. Human action would no longer
consist in beginning from oneself, from one's own initiative,
however active or passive. The mind's lucidity sees through
moral talk to the truth, where initiative confonns to a deeper
hidden order 0/ things, reality in its truth. Realism not morality
would have the final say. The only "moral" dictum for
philosophy would be that which enabled Spinoza to name his
metaphysics an Ethics, the motivation behind all science: Be real.
The on)y human option: to be or not to be. Freedom would thus
be necessity, recognition of an inevitable confonnity to the way
things are, accepting one's inevitable place, a cog within a larger
totality. Even Sartre, the celebratcd "philosopher of freedom,"
defincd freedom in tenns of existence, as negation of the real,
hence as a matter of lucidity and only a matter of lucidity.
Though one is rather less sanguine today about the completeness
-or finality of the mind's lucidity, lucidity still guides
philosophical conceptions of freedom. Yet when all is said and
done, neither skepticism nor irony nor cynicism -- the moral
products of science -- can serve as substitutes for morality.
They are rather symptoms of its loss. Science cannot pull itself
up by its bootstraps, it may know the real, but It lacks a why and
wherefore.
In this way Levinas shows the intimate relation between the
interests of epistemology and an ontology of war, war as the
ultimate vision of epistemology. War is fundamental when the
reality to which an individual's understanding conforms, and
from which an individual derives its entire sense, is nothing more
and nothing other than a calculus of forces. In view of this
vision, this "framing," as Heidegger called it, alternative
meanings -- including all of morality -- would become a
shadow play of second-order interpretations explained away as
weakness, ignorance, infantilism, primitivism, class
con~ciousness, etc.. "Concerning these things," Parmenides
wrote, "the decision lies here: either it is, or it is not. But it has
been decided, as was necessary, that the one way is unknowable
and unnameable (for it is not true road) and that the other is real
and true."IO Heraclitus, despite his opposition to Pannenides,
indecd because of his op-position to Parmenides, works within
the same parameters, defined by being and non- being, though he
sides with non-being. Thus he ends by expressing the same
"truth" as Pannenides, but even more succinctly: "War is the
father and king of all."11 What sleepwalkers label "murder," for
instance, would in truth be the natural or cultural product of a
play of hidden involuntary forces, such as genetic coding, diet,
IOJohn Manslcy Robinson, All lllirol/Ilclion 10 Early Greek Philosophy
(Boston: Houghton Mimin, Co., 1968), p. 113.
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famj]y, glossed with an unreflective but merely cultural
interpretation. "But," declares Nietzsche, "there is no 'being'
behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction
added to the deed -- the deed is everything. ... [N]o wonder if
the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness and
hatred exploit this belief [of the doer behind the deed] more
ardently than the belief that the strollg man is free to be weak and
the bird of prey to be a lamb -- for thus they gain the right to
make the bird ofprey accolllltable for being a bird ofprey." The
murderer is not a "murderer" reali)' but a natural born killer. The
moral language of "murder," "sin," "guilt," "punishment," would
be semantic misunderstanding, unscientific glosse What is really
at work is power, will to power, the war of all against a11.
If the mind's lucid vision of the truth of reality is ultimate
and war fundamental, it follows that inter-human relations are
also, in the final account, a matter ofpolitics, diplomacy, rhetoric,
success, a matter of strategy and tactic but not morality. The
science of the real would be truth, morality would for
ignoramuses. Thus Spinoza's book about religion and morality is
ultimately a political manual, a Theologico-Political Treatise,
written for those who see truth in order to protect themselves
from those who do not see. Knowers want neither to be duped
by morality nor to be harmed by the ignorance of "moralists."
The language of morality would be a rhetorical strategy or tactic
in a deeper game of politics, just as the world knew that the
"Desert Storm" war was not about democracy in the Middle East
or the political integrity of Kuwait, but rather about protecting the
price and flow of inexpensive oil for America. "The art of
foreseeing war," Levinas writes, "and of winning it by every
means -- politics -- is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise
of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to
naivete." Hobbes, Spinoza and Nietzsche could hardly be more
explicit agreeing with perspective, but it is no less at play in
Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida.
But if we are not duped by morality, if epistemology does
not have the last word, then politics can have an entirely different
meaning. War itself would be judged. One would distinguish
just from unjust wars. If we are not duped by morality, if
sincerity and not totality is the ground of the truc, then politics
too would serve or dis-serve the good. Rather than a disguised
form of war, an indice of victories and defeats, politics would
rather be another way of instituting goodness. Politics aiming for
justice, poJitics in relation to ethical transcendence, would be
"messianic." In an imperfect world whose imperfection would
not consist simply in incomplete knowledge, but rather in the
separation of the "oughf' from the "is," the ultimate struggle
would not be the sheer power of one force against other forces
but the ethical effort to restrain evil and promote good, in moral
judgements which would provide the ultimate meaning and
measure of politics. Politics would have a transcendent
dimension: to act for another future than one's own, to act for the
future ofhumanity.
In this way peace would underlie struggle, even the
struggles that break out in war. In contrast to the virile values of
a warrior culture, war in this case would aim not only for victory
but for a just peace. Peace, then, like war, has two radically
different senses, one genuine and the other a disguised fonn of
war, cold war. For peace, too, can be a fonn of war, the peace of
Pax Romana, is at bottom war -- Pax in bello -- because it is
not the peace that concludes war, but the temporary equilibrium
established and maintained by the victories and defeats of war.
In the peace that is at bottom war, peace is really only victory, the
imposition of order, placing one's own idols in the other's
te"!ples, reducing the other to the same. Such ersatz peace
violate's singularity -- the other's and one's own -- because it
is enforced precisely to the extent that singularity is repressed.
Its epistemological fonn is knowing the individuality of the
individual not in its singularity but in its subsumption under the
general, its placement within a calculus, its contextualization, as
if this truth of the individual, and only this truth, were equivalent
to the singularity of the individual.
These two senses of peace, like the two senses of war,
dcpcnd on two very different approaches to the uniqueness ofthe
individual: extemal and interna!. Extemally.itis an undeniable
truth that all spacial-temporal entities are unique insofar as no
two of them occupy the same space at the same time. Here
individuality derives from position, location, context,
differentials. Any resistance to this differential uniqueness would
not be fundamental, but would rcflect only an indetennination
that has lIot_l'et been grasped. Indetennination, which nlight
SeCITI to be the secret or mystery ofthe individual, is in reality but
a dclay or deferral -- even if never recouperable of
determination in tenns of a larger whole. What would resist
knowledge in the individual would thus be essentially relative,
provisional, the "not yet," but in no way an absolute resistance.
"The peace of empires," Levinas writes, "issued from war rests
on war."
But uniqueness can also mean singularity. Not a place
within a system, but a starting point, a degree zero, an initiative,
which orients -- and judges -- all differential contexts. This
signification can make no sense from a purely cognitive point of
view, which always contextualizes. Rather, its sense is from the
first ethicaI. l-Iere morality would not be a temporary ignorance,
a naive gloss on reality, but rather the very source of meaning.
Deeper than the distinctions bctween reality and appearance,
truth and falsehood would depend on the distinction between
sincerity and masquerade, suffering and indifference,
for-the-other and for-oneself, good and evil. An individual alone,
the knowing subject, would be a11 truth, to be sure, but it would
also be all illusion -- it would lack the capacity of verification.
All meanings would be possible, but none could be secured, none
would be true or false. One thinks of Descartes's problem of
solipsism, but no less of the delusions of Dr. Daniel Shreiber.
Only the radical alterity of the other person has the force --
moral force -- to obligate and fix the seIf, the self subject as
subjected to the other, as responsibility for the other. The radical
alterity of the other person bursts through forms, historicalor
otherwise, and commands absolutely, i.e., commands ethicaIly.
"Thou shalt not murder" commands behind everything said. In
the face of such a face the self is held to itself deeper than the
confines of any context. "I am my brother's keeper," in the face
of the other, prior to my own questions. That is to say, the I is
itself insofar as it is its brother's keeper, the I is -- ethically exists
-- in the mode of a brother's keeper. The self is itself ethically
subject to the other, as for-the-other-before- itself. Only by
means of this proximity, can one approach another in peace.
Only in this proximity is the ultimate and ethical significance of
the \vorld constituted. Here peace would not be a temporary or
artificial order imposed by reducing the other to the same, or the
same to the other, a victory or a defeat. Rather peace would
come -- even in times ofwarl2 -- from the proximity ofunique
singularities whose significance comes from a breach in the
totality, an ethical breach. Not to be, but to be better.
Genuine peace disrupts the totalization of war not by
defeating it, but by transcending its reach. Moral power would
not be stronger than the real, but better. Hence nothing is weaker
and at the same time nothing is stronger than moral power, for it
transcends yet commands the power of war. Philosophy, bound
to the real, bound to the true, refuses to acknowledge the radical
transcendence of ethics, for philosophy is always "first
philosophy" as philosophy first. Yet the stringent requirements of
ethics are not more stupid than philosophy, they are faster, as it
were, deeper, more important. Shame, suffering, obligation,
responsibility, justice are not insufficient knowledge, they are
impositions, inlposed before they can be known, imposed with
priorities prior to knowledge. Before one knows the good one
does the good. Inserting a non-cognitive moral dimension into
philosophical discourse, speaking Hebrew in Greek, as it were, is
the entire effort and effect of Levinas's writings. Peace would
thus not be more naive than war but more trusting, more difficult.
Morality exerts more stringent requirements than the
requirements of knowledge. It demands responsibility in a self
prior to the "I think" which subsequently will know itself to be
the ground of all knowledge. Knowledge comes first, to be sure,
but already too late. Ethics also comes last. It makes demands
on a self beyond its most ecstatic projections, obligations
extending into a future not its own -- the future of humanity,
justice -- beyond foreseeable horizons, but already imposed by
the other who faces. It is prior to and beyond knowledge not as a
transcendental apriori, i.e., as a condition of knowledge, but
rather because the exigency of its demands, the obligation of its
alOne thinks of the Gennan and English soJdiers who inthe midst of the
horrors of WWI, on Christmas day, would walk forward from lheir respective
trenches into "no man's land:' to share a gJass of wine and a holiday toast, then
return and resume their bloody struggle.
beginning, an initiative called forth by the other. It undennines
participatory submergence as weil as reflective contextualization
by the greater stringencies, the more intense demands, that
emerge from taking responsibility. It transforms self and society
trom place holders, whether blind or seeing, to source points of
personal and social obligations, responsibilities, and the call for
justice. "Not with the voice that would surround the totality,"
Levinas writes, "and where one could, arbitrarily, think what one
likes, and thus promote the claims of a subjectivity free as the
wind. It is a relationship with a surplus always exterior to the
totality." This surplus which bursts through myth and structure is
precisely and nothing other than the commanding "face" of the
other which obligates the self to its responsibility for the other
and for all others.
Out of this initiate comes the peace of a genuine and not
merely a differential difference. Moral proximity with the other is
an expression neither of victory or defeat, nor is it a
complacency, indifference or self-satisfaction confined within a
closed or open system. Rather it is the difficult peace which
comes from "non-in-difference" to the other. Here peace is not
the result of reduction, whether pre-reflective submergence or
reflective contextualization, but rather as the most sober sobriety,
wakefulness itself, respect for difference as response to
difference. Not the peace of identity, whether lost or found, but
the peace of piuralism. Fission not fusion. The land the other,
and the I and others, are not reduced to the sameness of mythic
participation or of intelligible identity, but rather are stimulated,
provoked, disrupted, oriented toward and by the good. The I is
thus neither a part nor a whole, but is rather the shattered
initiative of an always insufficient ethical approach to the other, a
moral proximity. In this fissuring ofthe self -- the egoity ofthe
I as its brother's keeper, the I for-the-other -- subjectivity is
elected to itself, to its singularity. Each self is singularly the
unique bearer of obligations and responsibilities, a moral Atlas,
hearing the whole world in its ethical incompleteness. Levinas is
. fond of quoting the words of the Priest Zossima's mortally ill
eIder brother Markel from Dostoyevsky's The Brotlzer's
Karamozov: "We are all guilty of all and for all men before a11,
and I more than others." Upon each self weigh obligations and
obligations, the responsibility of its responsibilities, are more
important than knowledge, and as such give significance to
knowledge, providing it the orientation -- the why and wherefore
-- which knowledge essentially lacks. This point must be
emphasized. Knowledge knows only difference, but cannot
judge better or worse. The exigencies of morality and justice, in
contrast, are not merely different than the requirement of
knowledge, since knowledge comprehends nothing better than
difference, they are at the same time more importallt than the
priorities of philosophy, and for this reason provide orientation
for knowledgc as for all hunlan endeavor. The beginning of
wisdom cuts dceper than the origins ofknowledge.
Philosophy is thus always already in the service of an ethics
it can hardly acknowledge. First, the alterity of the other is an
obligation before it is an object. Second, the responsibility of the
seIf is a responsiveness before it is a cognition. Third, these
obligations and responsibilities which emerge in the proximity of
the face-to-face call beyond the horizons foreseeable by
knowledge, for they are a call for an unforeseeabIe justice for a11
humankind. Desire, the self constituted as a desiring being, thus
has at bottom a far greater and far more difficult destiny than that
known by phiJosophy with its desire to be transfigured by the
desire to know. More desirable still is the desire for goodness,
where desire grows as it is satisfied, in an always insufficient
responsibility for the other before oneself, suffering the otber's
suffenng, aiming at what cannot be foreseen, predicted, grasped
in a totaJity.
One must take pains whcn articulating an ethics to avoid
interpreting morality in terms of knowledge. To be sure,
knowledge and morality share a critique of mythe But they do so
with different ends in view. Knowledge undermines the
submergence of self and society in tbe arbitrary forces invoked
through participatory myth by a relocation of self and society into
a geometry of principles and proportions, into a differential
calculus of ideas. Mythic submergence is transformed and raised
to intelligible justification, to reasons and a giving of reasons.
Morality, in contrast, is not simply a relocation of the subject
from intoxication to reflection, but is rather a taking of
responsibility, a taking on of obligations, beginning at the
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responsibilities for eaeh other and for aIl others. This weight,
which human seales cannot measure, is the moral self.
Singularity emerges as a nonsubstitutable responsibility, a moral
burden upon which the reality of the whole world depends. Or
else there is just war. But war cannot suppress this paeifie
relation to the other, this sincerity, this goodness.
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